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For if the individuals do not exist, then on Menzel's actualist (479) position, the 
relations do not yet exist either. 
2. Constituents not usually classed as parts might include form and matter, 
nature and material supposit, subject and accident. See Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae (ST) la, 3, aa. 2,3,6. 
3. So e.g. Aquinas, ST la, 3, 3; Ia 40, 1 ad 1; in VII Meta., lect. 5, #1380. 
4. Wolterstorff calls our differing present-day ontological style "relation 
ontology." This term is not helpful: constituency is itself a relation. 
5. STla 85, 5 ad 3. 
6. Again, at QD de Potentia Dei (DP) 8, 3, Aquinas writes that "Socrates and 
Plato are called hypostases because they are predicated of one only," thus indi-
cating that he takes the identity-statement "Socrates is Socrates" as a predication. 
At ST Ia 13, 12, Thomas calls such A=A identities "predications" and expressly 
avers that they are just like other predications in having both subject and predi-
cate refer to the same entity. See also In V Meta., leet. 9, #891, and DP 2,1 ad 2. In 
effect, Thomas construes predication in accord with what is now called Wang's 
Law, taking sentences of the form "Fa" as "really" of the form "(3x)(Fx • x=a)." 
Thomas' analysis of predication refutes the canard that Thomas or medieval 
Aristotelians in general na·ively take the structure of reality to mirror the struc-
ture of discourse. The relation between Socrates and whiteness is inherence, not 
identity. Yet in Thomas' analysis of "Socrates is white," the logical relation 
involved is identity, not inherence. 
7. Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia (Turin: Marietti, 1926), p. 14. This 
and all translations are mine. 
8. Ibid., p. 15. 
9. Ibid., p. 17. 
10. "Human," the species term, "signifies indistinctly all that is essentially in 
Socrates" because it refers to Socrates as that which bears the particular, individ-
ual form which gives Socrates his essential properties. 
11. Ibid., p. 18. 
12. See e.g. ST Ia 3, 3. 
13. If this is correct and my reading of Aquinas' view of predication is cor-
rect, is Aquinas really a "constituent" ontolOgist? 
14. Conee includes in this abilities to have a proposition be true without 
doing anything to have them true (449). So apparently Conee believes in abilities 
one can exercise without in any way doing anything. I am not sure how to take 
this. 
15. Compare Hoffman and Rosenkrantz' distinction between violating and 
superseding a physical law (200-1). 
16. "Before" and its cognate terms can be read temporally or logically. 
17. At least, theists not antecedently convinced that something could be AO. 
Christian Philosophy, by Etienne Gilson (translated by Armand Maurer). 
Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1993. Pp. xxv and 139. 
$19.95 (paper). 
THOMAS D. D'ANDREA, University of St. Andrews 
The publication of this translation of Gilson's introduction a la philosophic chre-
tienne is a welcome event for serious students of medieval philosophy and 
theology in the more than obvious way that it makes the French work avail-
able for the first time in English. The translation should help give this slender 
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volume the attention it deserves from students of Aquinas and of Gilson and 
of medieval thought generally-attention it has not hitherto received in 
North America. Though the themes Gilson treats in Christian Philosophy are 
not new for him, he approaches them from a fresh angle and treats them 
with a lucidity that is the mark of many years of patient reflection. 
I 
The work belongs to Gilson's intellectual maturity: it was authored in 
1960 as a sort of companion piece to Le thomisme (in its six successive revised 
editions stretching from 1913 to 1964) and to Elements of Christian Philosophy 
(1960). Le thomisme, as Gilson relates in the preface of its sixth and final edi-
tion, was born out of his early teaching career in France and sought to pro-
vide scholars with an historical introduction to those teachings of Thomas 
Aquinas theologian that Thomas justified on the basis of natural reason.! 
Elements, on the other hand, was aimed primarily at Gilson's English-speak-
ing colleagues and students at Toronto's Pontifical Institute of Medieval 
Studies. Its purpose was to provide an historical introduction to Aquinas's 
seminal philosophical positions for those conversant with the tradition of 
scholastic philosophy and committed to Thomism as a living philosophical 
option. Gilson's effort in the work was to throw the key philosophical doc-
trines in Thomas's teaching into clearer relief by relocating them within their 
historical context. 
The task of Introduction it la philosophie chretienne was something different. 
In this work born "au bout de la plume" and intended for francophones on the 
continent, Gilson sought to show the deep interconnection-whether natural 
or supernatural he wished not to say-between certain metaphysical tenets 
in Aquinas and Christian spirituality. The work was intended as a sort of 
free-flowing theological meditation on those philosophical doctrines of 
Aquinas which after nearly fifty years of study Gilson thought particularly 
fruitful-philosophically, theologically, and religiously-for the present day. 
These doctrines were for him the nerve and muscles of Thomas's entire 
teaching-difficult to uncover, but crucial for the life of the corpus to which 
they gave vitality and strength.2 
The work was composed in the elegant and witty, if at times elusive, 
prose for which Gilson was famous. Reading Gilson has never been an easy 
task, because the comprehension of his writing presupposes a high degree of 
historical-exegetical knowledge of past philosophical doctrines-the kind 
one does not find much of in most English-speaking philosophy depart-
ments these days. As Vernon Bourke once noted, Gilson's method, acquired 
from his training under the sociologucs at the Sorbonne (Emile Durkheim, 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl) and from his early friendship with annaliste historians 
Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre at Strasbourg, was simple but demanding: to 
read the great figures in the history of philosophy in their original works 
eschewing secondary literature, to situate their doctrines within their histori-
cal context, and to expound their thought without mixing in one's own per-
sonal philosophical speculation. As Gilson himself was wont to say, the 
intellectual historian's task is but to understand and to make understood. 
In the case of Thomas Aquinas, though, GilEC:l the master exegete was 
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also Gilson the advocate. Gilson never sought to disguise his philosophical 
preference for Aquinas's doctrines, though he claimed that his allegiance to 
Thomas was the product of his considerable study of the history of philoso-
phy and not the guiding principle of that study. In Christian Philosophy then, 
as in his other works on Aquinas, Gilson is not merely expounding 
Thomas's teachings but also commending them. This gives the prose of 
Christian Philosophy its curious character: context-sensitive exposition embed-
ded within a commendatory, even argumentative, rhetoric. The very title of 
the work, lacking a reference to Aquinas, indicates that Gilson means to 
endorse the positions of Aquinas he is expositing. 
Dialectical rigor was not Gilson's forte, or at any rate he did not devote 
much attention to it in his work. The task of bringing to bear the insights 
from his comparative exegesis of Aquinas-Aquinas understood in compar-
ison to both his contemporaries and the main figures of modern philoso-
phy-on the more rigorous and exact, if at times myopic and historically ill-
informed, discussions in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy 
remains to be accomplished. But what Gilson did excel at was narrative 
reconstruction of past philosophical doctrines. In his mind, for a student of 
philosophy to have laid bare the first principles of a philosophical system 
and to have discovered the fundamental questions with which it was faced 
in its formation was enough to see whether the system was tenable and 
where and how it might be inadequate with respect to alternative systems. 
This approach dominates, for example, his earlier works The Unity of 
Philosophical Experie7lce (William James Lectures at Harvard, 1936-7) and 
Being and Some Philosophers (1949). 
The method of philosophical work which Gilson practiced, encouraged, 
and saw as stimulated by the religious context of scholasticism (but lost 
through the dialectical excesses of late scholasticism) was prolonged medita-
tion on the nature of first principles. In the activity of philosophical thinking 
he valued insight over dialectical skill. As he states almost dryly in Elements 
of Christian Philosophy, "Metaphysics is essentially a reflection on the first 
principle. It takes years for each one of us to grasp it. ... "3 Philosophers con-
structing metaphysical theories rarely commit logical errors in drawing out 
the consequences of their metaphysical first principles, he claims in chapter 6 
of the present work (p. 72). If they err it is in their inadequate grasp of the 
true first principles or, in metaphysics, of the true first principle: the act-of-
being. 
II 
The first chapter of Christian Philosophy, "Philosophizing within Faith," 
intends to place the rest of the book's straightforwardly philosophical mater-
ial in the theological light it had in Aquinas's own mind. Gilson notes that, 
according to Thomas, faith's assent to the existence of God revealing pro-
vides a certitude superior to unaided reason's assent to God's existence on 
the basis of the more cognitively satisfying but less reliable means of philo-
sophical demonstration. Faith has an infallible, omniscient God as its cause: 
God moves the believer's will to elicit intellectual assent to what God has 
revealed and to what is in many instances cognitively inevident. Part of what 
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God reveals, of course, is His very existence---as to Moses, for instance. 
It is well known that for Thomas unaided reason can know with certitude 
that a being we call God exists, but it cannot in principle obtain knowledge 
of God as He is in Himself. This knowledge can only be had by the assent of 
faith to God's self-revelation. And though unaided human reason can in 
principle arrive at certitude through its operations-Thomas is no sceptic-
its sense of having obtained certitude must be accompanied by a certain 
modesty. The cause of reason's certitude is only reason itself, a non-infallible 
power. Experience frequently shows us that we have not the certitude about 
some object of knowledge we at first thought we had. 
To clarify this with an example, for Thomas the simple untutored believer 
has more certitude on the basis of divine revelation that "He Who Is" is the 
most appropriate name of God and most appropriate way of thinking about 
God's nature ("Dominus respondit ... sic dices filiis israel: Qui est misit me ad 
vas," Exod. 3:14) than would the non-believing metaphysician who arrived 
at this same conclusion after years of hard metaphysical thinking which con-
vinced him both that there is a First and Final Cause of all being, and that 
this being's nature (esse ipsum subsistens) is to exist without limit or restrictive 
determination (a conclusion both Aquinas and Gilson maintain as rationally 
demonstrable and as rationally demonstated). Of course the non-believing 
metaphysician would have in this instance a greater, though still highly 
imperfect, comprehension of the divine nalure than the simple believer. 
In Gilson's reading of Thomas, proofs of the existence of God have a use, 
but a limited one, for an inquirer. They give us, as far as we can tell, certain 
knowledge of the existence of a First Cause of all reality, and they tell us 
some interesting though very incomplete things about His nature. 
Unfortunately, none of the knowledge they give us is more than instrumen-
tally valuable for our knowing and corresponding to the supernatural and 
hence philosophically unknowable plan of salvation this First Cause has 
established for us and revealed to us. Philosophical knowledge of the God 
who, unknown to philosophy as such, has revealed Himself through contin-
gent events in history i.e; in no way salvific (pp. 9-12). 
Against the frequent objection some Thomists have put to this reading of 
Gilson's-that for Thomas one cannot know and believe in the existence of 
God at the same time; thus the Christian philosopher who can demonstrate 
God's existence is dispensed from, and indeed incapable of believing by faith 
that God exists-Gilson correctly responds that for Thomas and in reality 
one can at the same time know by reason that this First Cause exists and 
believe by faith that this First Cause exists and is Triune. Were this not the 
case, the simple believer, acknowledging the existence of God on the basis of 
faith, would have more certitude that God exists than would the believer-
philosopher who, once she acknowledged the existence of God on the basis 
of unaided reason, would be incapable of the more certain if less perspicu-
ous knowledge of God's existence through faith! 
Gilson reminds us that Thomas's constant teaching, following the lead of 
the Letter to the Hebrews, is that without faith one cannot please God ("Sine 
fide impossibile est placere Deo," Heb. 11:6). Whatever the state of his knowl-
edge, the inquirer who wishes to be saved must accept or be disposed to 
accept, the existence and nature of God on God's own tem1s-that is, on the 
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authority of God's own testimony. However accomplished a metaphysician 
he may be, he too must render or be prepared to render the "obedience of 
faith" (Rom. 1 :5) if he wishes to enter into eternal life. 
What exact value, then, do Thomas's quinque viae and his entire philo-
sophical theology have for an inquirer? In an obvious sense they would if 
true provide him with some means of recognizing whether a purported 
divine revelation were credible: they would aid him in seeing whether the 
revelation was consistent with what can be known, even demonstrated, 
about the first and uncaused cause of reality. In this way they would remove 
an obstacle to assenting to a true revelation and eliminate a potential cause of 
unbelief. In a more subtle but perhaps equally important way, these meta-
physical reasonings, conjoined with the data of revelation, would permit the 
believer to construct a kind of science of sacred doctrine, and the work of its 
construction could be a spirituality: having recognized Christian revelation 
as credible and assenting to it through a divine gift of faith, a Christian 
inquirer would be enabled to draw closer via love to the source of this gift by 
means of a rational construct. This construct, speculative theology, would 
make God's infinite lovableness more visible and would eo ipso lead its prac-
titioner to love God more. 
Philosophical theology like supernatural theology is for Aquinas a work 
inspired by love and undertaken to increase love (Gilson wrote Christian 
Philosophy in large part to argue this). For all its intellectuality and cognitive 
rigor it can be, if carried out with the right motive, a thoroughgoing 
Christian spirituality or path to union with the Triune God. It was undertak-
en by Thomas himself not to diminish reliance on supernatural faith and the 
merit of believing by faith, but to increase his capacity to love the God of 
faith. 
Here, as elsewhere in his treatment of this question, Gilson might have 
said more about how arriving at philosophical demonstrations of the being 
Christians call God could suffice for, or go along way toward providing the 
non-believing inquirer with, the implicit faith necessary for salvation. 
(Thomas speaks of this, for example, in ST 2-2.2.7, ad 3m.) By fides implicita 
Aquinas means, roughly, the conviction that there is a good and provident 
cause of the world and that we are in need of His aid to attain salvation. Any 
previously non-believing inquirer who arrived at this conviction through 
sound philosophical argumentation would be intellectually, though not per 
se morally, ready to assent to Christian revelation. His philosophical knowl-
edge would be proto-salvific for him, and if the Gospel were never preached 
to him and he were of good will, it would be salvific due to those merits of 
Christ applicable to all humans of any era who are disposed to receive them. 
III 
The central thesis of the remainder of this book is a bold one and familiar 
to all readers of Gilson's earlier writings on Aquinas: Thomas, in inquiring 
about how best to rationally conceive the divine nature while believing by 
faith that Yawheh's identification of His own name-the "Ego sum qui sum" 
and "Qui est" of Exodus-had provided the definitive and certain parame-
ters, the interpretandum, for rational speculation, read in these texts a literal 
284 Faith and Philosophy 
meaning which none of his scholastic predecessors or contemporaries had 
seen or grasped (and which many or most of his scholastic successors and 
followers, Domingo Banez excepted, have since failed to grasp). According 
to Thomas's theological speculation, the divine nature is best understood as 
an infinite subsistent act of existing. Everything else, everything other than 
God, is thought to be complex in at least this respect: there is present in it not 
only an act of existing, but an essence which structures and limits that act of 
existing and so "finitizes" it and differentiates it from God's pure and limit-
less act of existing. 
What is radically new-and correct, Gilson thinks-about this bit of 
Sciptural interpretation is the distinction it draws between esse and essentill, 
and the primacy it accords to esse. Gilson wisely avoids asserting what no 
one but an intimate acquaintance of Thomas or Thomas himself could assert: 
that Thomas arrived at this metaphysical insight, crucial because involving 
the first and underlying principle of his entire system of thought in both its 
philosophical and theological branches (chapters 2-10 of Christian Philosophy 
aim to exhibit this), while first reading Exodus; or, that Thomas discovered it 
in Exodus because of his prior study of the history of metaphysical thinking 
from the pre-Socratics, as reported by Aristotle, up to Avicenna and 
A verroes. Whatever the case be as to how Thomas discovered the non-identi-
ty of esse and essentia in all beings other than God, Thomas did see that the 
literal sense of the pertinent texts in Exodus could support this new ontol-
ogy, and so he went about developing and defending that ontology on its 
own rational terms, confident that it did not contradict the word of God and 
that it might be the most accurate and compelling interpretation of a part of 
divine revelation yet advanced. 
Assuming that Gilson's reading of Thomas is correct on this point, why 
should one accept Thomas's new ontology or see in it a watershed event in 
the history of metaphysical speculation? Everything hinges on how one con-
ceives the first principles of being, and in the matter of first principles there 
can be no demonstrations. Gilson would have it that Aquinas has been the 
sole thinker in occidental history to get it right concerning the first principle 
(p. 55). Aquinas alone has posited in each finite substance an essence with a 
correlative indwelling act of existence related to that essence as act to poten-
cy. He is the only thinker to have seen existence as not merely a factual state, 
but as the exercise of a created and contingent-from-moment-to-moment act. 
This ontology, Gilson argues, is true to our intuitions about the difference 
between real and imaginary beings and preserves everything of value in 
other realist accounts of the first principle. It also has the merit of providing 
the believer with a perspicuous way of distinguishing God from creatures 
(including immaterial creatures), of establishing the oneness of the divine 
nature, and of showing the immediate and continuous dependence of all 
that is not God on God. 
Because of the difficulty of the subject matter and the remoteness of meta-
physical first principles from our powers of understanding, debates about 
this question of fundamental ontology are not likely ever to cease. But 
Gilson's very definite statement of one position on this matter is likely to con-
tinue to have many adherents among readers of Aquinas, and it has, wherev-
er one comes down, advanced discussions in metaphysics considerably. 
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TV 
Armand Maurer deserves high praise for an elegant and uncluttered 
English rendering of Gilson's French and the addition of some helpful 
explanatory notes and citations to the text. And anyone who has racked his 
brains on, and lost his way not a few times through, the thicket of Gilson's 
texts on the meaning and usefulness of the term "Christian philosophy," will 
be grateful for Fr. Maurer's chronological guided tour through Gilson's 
evolving thinking on the question. 
Gilson began by viewing Christian philosophy as that body of rationally 
justifiable philosophical conclusions arrived at through the effort of 
Christians to understand the Christian faith. Toward the end of his career, he 
saw that in Aquinas, at least, this body of strictly rational conclusions was 
regarded as properly theological (ST 1.1.3, ad 2m is the key text). 
For Thomas theology is the attempt to approximate God's own under-
standing of Himself, and God, in knowing Himself, knows perfectly all else 
that is or could be as something falling under His infinite causal power. Thus 
though theology begins with what God has revealed of Himself, it aspires to 
a knowledge of the entire created order understood as flowing forth from 
God. To have this sort of knowledge the principles of revelation do not suf-
fice; the Christian inquirer needs a rational account of the created order. God 
has not revealed much about the created order, but, as its omniscient cause, 
He could have revealed everything about it: the elements of a true account of 
the created order are then "revealable" (revelabilia). 
It is the theologian'S task, in Thomas's mind, to come up vvith the best 
account natural reason can furnish of the world (revelabilill) and then to SV11-
thesize this rational interpretation of created being with the elements of a~tu­
al revelation (reveiata). This work of speculative theology-the highest dis-
cursive wisdom for Thomas-was precisely the task in which he hilnself was 
engaged. 
One might quibble with Fr. Maurer's rendering of Gilson's etre as 'being" 
instead of the more awkward but more exact "act-of-being." Philosophy is 
not literature, and exactness of meaning should take precedence over style 
whenever a choice between the two is unavoidable. It is simply hard to keep 
separate in one's mind the difference between the ambiguous English 
'being" (etrc) and "a being" (etllnt)-€specially in the long passages concern-
ing Aquinas's ontology with which this work abounds. 
As was noted above, Gilson's work-and Christian Philosophy is no excep-
tion here-can be faulted for lacking the dialectical rigor of Aquinas himself. 
If, as some Thomists have argued, the thought of Aquinas represents a sort 
of middle way between the dialectical sharpness of analytic philosophy and 
the system-oriented and insight-oriented nature of continental philosophy, 
Gilson's work contains not much of the former. However, only the rarest 
thinker can be proficient at all philosophical tasks, and Gilson's careful and 
wide-ranging historical studies are a great source-book for those attracted to 
Aquinas's thought and inclined to analytic-style philosophizing. For 
Christian thinkers generally Gilson has done a masterful job of recasting our 
understanding of Aquinas so that it approximates more closely the way 
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Thomas understood himself-as a speculative biblical theologian who 
sought philosophical proficiency in order better to expound the content of 
Sacred Scripture. 
NOTES 
1. Le thomisme: Introduction IlIa philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1989), p. 7. 
2. Le thomisme, p. 8. 
3. Elements of Christim I Philosophy (New American Library: N ew York, 1960), 
p.106. 
Reported Miracles: A Critique of Hume, by J. Houston. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xii and 264. $59.95. 
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College 
This book is a defense of the idea that reported miracles can make a positive 
contribution to a case for theistic belief. After a brief introduction Houston 
turns to a discussion of reported miracles in the work of Augustine, Aquinas, 
Locke, Hume, and Bradley and Troeltsch. He claims that these figures made 
contributions which are important to contemporary reflection about mira-
cles. However, he makes almost no reference to the first three thinkers after 
the chapters in which he discusses them, though his understanding of the 
nature and purpose of miracles is generally in line with theirs. But the mate-
rial on the others is clearly essential to the balance of his book. Hume's cri-
tique of miracles is the main argument to which Houston replies, and the 
analyses of historiography given by Bradley and Troeltsch provide a more 
focused, detailed position to which Houston also responds. 
Hume defines a miracle as "a transgression of a law of nature by a partic-
ular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. II I 
Houston accepts and defends this definition, pointing out that transgression, 
in Hume's sense, does not imply any inconsistency in plans or purposes on 
the part of the agent of the miracle. Houston also notes that on this defini-
tion a miracle must be worked by the Deity or some invisible agent. It fol-
lows that an event cannot be classified as a miracle simply because it seems 
to (or even does actually) transgress some law of nature; it must also be 
assigned to the proper sort of agent. Therefore, Houston designates an 
event which seems to violate a law of nature but which has not yet been 
attributed to an agent of the proper sort as a supposed or putative or conjec-
tural miracle. 
The thrust of Hume's critique of reports of miracles is well known. A 
miracle by definition is an event which transgresses a law of nature, but laws 
of nature are supported by all human experience of events of the sort in 
question. Therefore, it is always more rational to believe that the testimony 
to the miracle is mistaken, deceptive, or in some other way erroneous than it 
is to believe that the event happened as reported. 
Houston responds to this argument by pointing out that it seems to 
